Reflecting on Lessons Learned From the U.S. Invasion of Iraq, 10 Years Later
2013-03-19 22:44:00


JUDY WOODRUFF: Finally tonight, we return to Iraq and the lessons learned 10 years after the U.S. invasion.(1)
JUDY WOODRUFF:最后今晚,我们返回到伊拉克和美国入侵之后的 10 年的经验教训。

I'm joined now by two journalists who have written extensively on the subject, New York Times reporter and author of "The Endgame: The Inside Story of the Struggle for Iraq From George W. Bush to Barack Obama" Michael Gordon,(2)
我现在的两名记者有论述的主题、 纽约时报记者和作者迈克尔 · 戈登"结局: 里面的故事的斗争为伊拉克从乔治 W.布什到奧巴馬"在一起

and Washington Post editor Rajiv Chandrasekaran, author of "Imperial Life in the Emerald City: Inside Iraq's Green Zone."(3)
和华盛顿邮报编辑器拉吉夫 · Chandrasekaran,作者的"翡翠城的帝王生活: 伊拉克绿区里面."

We welcome you both to the NewsHour.(4)
我们欢迎你们两个都采访记。

Rajiv, it's been more than a year since the U.S. pullout. What shape is Iraq in after the war? What's the legacy of the war now?(5)
拉吉夫,它已经一年多以来美国撤军。战争结束后在伊拉克是什么形状?现在战争的后果是什么?

RAJIV CHANDRASEKARAN, The Washington Post: Well, Iraq, in my view, still remains a tinderbox with some real red-hot embers inside.(6)
RAJIV CHANDRASEKARAN, The Washington Post:嗯,伊拉克,在我看来,仍是一个火药桶与内部一些真正炽热的余烬。

There's some parts of the country where things are not just stable.(7)
有一些事情不只是稳定在全国各地。

They're booming in the southern parts of the country dominated by the majority Shiite population, fueled by plentiful oil revenue. You see construction. You see investment. Life's pretty good for those people.(8)
他们由多数什叶派人口,燃的丰富石油收入占主导地位的国家南部地区蓬勃发展。您看到施工。您看到的投资。生命的那些人好漂亮。

In the central part of the country, where the minority Sunni Arab population largely lives, particularly out west, people feel a lot more frustrated, a lot more disenfranchisement.(9)
中部的国家,少数逊尼派阿拉伯人口主要是住在哪里,出西方,尤其是在人们感到更多沮丧,更多的权利被剥夺。

In the capital, there have been some large protests by the Sunni community because they feel they have been cut out of the political process.(10)
在首都,有一些大规模的抗议活动的逊尼派社区因为他们觉得他们纷纷在政治进程之外。

And up north, where a quarter of the population lives, the ethnic Kurdish population, again, things look pretty good for them economically,(11)
北方,四分之一的人口住在哪里,库尔德族人,再,事情看不错为他们在经济上,

but there are real questions about the tensions there between them and the central government,(12)
但也有有之间的紧张关系他们和中央政府,真正的问题

particularly over oil revenue -- some key issues unresolved among these communities that were supposed to be addressed with the addition of more American troops that really have not been solved over these last several years.(13)
特别是在石油收入 — — 一些关键的问题在这些社区本来要加以加上更多的美国部队,真的还没有得到解决这些过去的几年当中没有得到解决。

JUDY WOODRUFF: Michael Gordon, you see problems associated with how the U.S. left and what's happened since then.(14)
JUDY WOODRUFF:迈克尔 · 戈登,你看到问题关联如何离开美国,并自那时以来发生了什么事。

MICHAEL GORDON, The New York Times: Well, one factor -- and I agree with Rajiv's breakdown of the situation in Iraq -- but another factor has really been the decline of American influence.(15)
MICHAEL GORDON, The New York Times:拉吉夫的击穿的情况在伊拉克 — — — — 的一个因素,并同意,但另一个因素真的下降了美国的影响。

And really over the last several years, it wasn't really the withdrawal of all of the forces, which Secretary Panetta has said has curtailed American political influence, but also there's been a bit of a disengagement on the part of the Obama administration itself.(16)
真的过去几年中,它并不是真的撤出所有部队,局长帕内塔曾说,削弱了美国的政治影响,但也一直有点脱离接触,行政当局奧巴馬本身。

JUDY WOODRUFF: What do you mean?(17)
JUDY WOODRUFF:你是什么意思?

MICHAEL GORDON: Well, I think they view Iraq as just another country. They don't have the same emotional or psychological or even foreign policy stake in it that the previous administration had.(18)
MICHAEL GORDON:嗯,我觉得他们查看伊拉克作为只是另一个国家。他们没有相同的情感或心理甚至外交政策股权它以前的政府了。

So I think the United States can't solve all the problems in Iraq certainly, but it's not playing as active and forceful and influential role in mediating these internal issues.(19)
因此,我认为美国不能解决所有的问题在伊拉克当然,但它不玩作为积极和有力和有影响力的作用,促成这些内部的问题。

JUDY WOODRUFF: What's the relationship, Rajiv, between the people of Iraq and their government? How is that working?(20)
JUDY WOODRUFF:关系,拉吉夫,伊拉克人民和他们的政府是什么?是如何工作的?

RAJIV CHANDRASEKARAN: Depends on which people.(21)
RAJIV CHANDRASEKARAN:取决于哪些人。

For the majority Shiite population, they see the government as largely working in their interests.(22)
对于多数什叶派人口,他们看到政府为他们的利益在很大程度上工作。

The others look at the government and say, these people aren't here to help me and serve me.(23)
其他人看着政府说,这些人在这里不是来帮助我,为我服务。

I think there is a desire among many Iraqis for sort of a big tent, more secular government. But that's not the shape of the political system that they have today.(24)
我认为有许多伊拉克人渴望的一个大帐篷,排序更世俗政府。但这不是他们今天所拥有的政治系统的形状。

And much of this, in my view, is a result of the legacy of the American occupation and our military intervention there, decisions made almost 10 years ago today.(25)
多这一点,在我看来,是遗留下来的美国占领,我们在那里的军事干预的结果,今天决定了几乎 10 年前。

De-Baathifying the country, meaning excluding some members of Saddam Hussein's Baath Party, those who didn't have any blood on their hands from future involvement in the country's economy and government,(26)
De Baathifying 的国家,意味着排除某些成员的萨达姆 · 侯赛因的复兴党,那些人没未来参与国家的经济和政府,从他们手上有血

disbanding the army, those have had a lasting legacy in pushing these other groups out into the fringes.(27)
解散军队,那些已经在推这些其他群体边缘上持久的遗产。

JUDY WOODRUFF: What would you add about the government?(28)
JUDY WOODRUFF:您将为政府增加了什么?

MICHAEL GORDON: Well, a big problem is not merely the sectarian and ethnic divides, but the prime minister, Nouri al-Maliki, has been an increasingly authoritarian figure.(29)
MICHAEL GORDON:嗯,很大的问题不是仅仅是宗派和种族分歧,但总理努里 · 马利基已越来越专制的图。

And he was a person that actually was picked by the American ambassador, Zalmay Khalilzad -- encouraged at least -- to run for the prime minister's post.(30)
而且他的人,其实由美国大使扎 — — 至少鼓励 — — 挑选竞选首相的职位。

But a problem that a lot of communities have in Iraq, the Sunni, the Kurds and even some Shia, is that he is overstepping the bounds of his constitutional authorities as commander in chief.(31)
但很多社区都有在伊拉克、 甚至一些什叶派逊尼派、 库尔德人的一个问题是他超越他宪法当局作为总司令。

The Obama administration made an effort before it took out the troops to try to curtail that and create a different governing arrangement. But it didn't work out.(32)
奧巴馬政府当局作出了努力之前拿出部队试图削减,并创建一个不同的管理安排。但它不太管用。

GWEN IFILL: Let me bring you both to the U.S. side.(33)
GWEN IFILL:让我带你到美国一侧的两个。

Michael, how -- you talk -- you both talk to the military a lot. But what -- how does the U.S. military view the war and what happened in Iraq for the most part?(34)
迈克尔,如何 — — 你说话 — — 你这两个军事谈论了很多。但什么 — — 如何不会美国的军事观点,战争和在伊拉克发生的大部分吗?

MICHAEL GORDON: Well, you're never going to have any one view even within an institution like the military certainly.(35)
MICHAEL GORDON:嗯,你永远不会当然有像军队的机构内甚至任何一个视图。

I do think that the military can look at what they did in Iraq and they see a lot of early mistakes in the first years which exacerbated the conflict, the rush to failure, so to speak, handing over to the Iraqis before they were ready to shoulder the burden.(36)
我认为,军队可以看看他们在伊拉克的所作所为和他们看到很多早期的错误而加剧冲突,移交给伊拉克人之前他们愿意承担失败,这样说,赶赴第一年。

I do think the surge, as a military operation and military strategy, was effective and was essential.(37)
我觉得飙升,作为一项军事行动和军事战略、 是有效的是必不可少的。

In fact, I can't imagine how President Obama could have withdrawn the forces and left behind a reasonably stable Iraq without it. So, I think the military acquitted itself well.(38)
事实上,我无法想象如何可撤销总统奧巴馬部队和左背后没有它合理稳定的伊拉克。因此,我认为军方开释本身很好。

Where there's been a shortfall has been on the political side in trying to craft a political set of arrangements in Iraq that leads to a stable and democratic country.(39)
凡已有短缺一直在试图制定一整套政治安排在通向一个稳定和民主国家的伊拉克在政治方面。

JUDY WOODRUFF: Rajiv, what's your sense on how the military views it and also lessons learned?(40)
JUDY WOODRUFF:拉吉夫,你感觉对军方如何看待它和还吸取的经验教训是什么?

RAJIV CHANDRASEKARAN: You look at the military today that is fighting still in Afghanistan, it looks nothing like the military that went into Baghdad in 2003,(41)
RAJIV CHANDRASEKARAN:你看今天战斗仍在阿富汗的军事,它一点也不像在 2003 年,走进巴格达的军事

the advancements in vehicles, from soft-skin Humvees with no armoring, to these big, hulking, mine-resistant trucks, the advancements in battlefield medicine,(42)
在车辆,从软皮肤军车与无铠装、 向这些大、 笨拙、 耐矿山卡车、 战场医学进步进步

just in the way our troops suppress insurgencies, instead of focusing in on killing and capturing bad guys exclusively, as we tried to do in 2003,(43)
我们的部队刚刚的方式制止叛乱团体,而不是杀死和捕获坏家伙完全是因为我们想要在 2003 年,在重点

this focus on counterinsurgency strategy and how it's really been absorbed within the ranks and implemented.(44)
这种注重反叛乱战略和如何它真的已匀行列并实施。

People can debate about whether it's a wise strategy or not or it's a -- it involves a good use of resources, but the way the military has gone about adapting and learning, particularly from those grim early years of the Iraq war, is nothing short of phenomenal, in my view.(45)
人们可以辩论关于它是否是一种明智的策略,或者它是一个 — — 它涉及到的资源,很好用,但军事方式去了关于适应和学习,特别是从伊拉克战争的严酷初年,是 nothing 时间不足的惊人,我认为。

JUDY WOODRUFF: What about the legacy? How do you see the legacy in terms of what the military has learned and how it's affected U.S. foreign policy?(46)
JUDY WOODRUFF:遗留问题呢?你怎么看遗留下来的军队已经学到什么和它如何影响美国的外交政策呢?

MICHAEL GORDON: Well, I think the military learned how to do counterinsurgency. The public opinion may no longer support that, but forever is a long time.(47)
MICHAEL GORDON:嗯,我觉得军事学会了如何做反叛乱。公众舆论可能不再支持这样做,但永远是很长时间。

And I think you can't say we won't have to do that again at some point in the future.(48)
我认为你不能说我们不会再做那些在某一时刻在将来。

Foreign policy-wise, Iraq poses some challenges, particularly now because of Syria,(49)
对外政策上,伊拉克面临一些挑战,尤其是现在由于叙利亚,

because Maliki has become and emerged essentially as a supporter of Assad, Bashar al-Assad, because he fears the consequences of a Sunni success really in Syria and what it might mean for his own domain and his own rule in Iraq.(50)
因为马利基已经变得和主要是为巴沙尔 · 阿萨德 · 阿萨德的支持者出现了,因为他担心后果的逊尼派成功真的在叙利亚和它自己的域和他自己在伊拉克的统治可能意味着什么。

And so it's become a very serious foreign policy challenge. And he, in fact, has been essentially cooperating with Iran, which has been flying military supplies across Iraq to Damascus.(51)
于是它已经成为一个非常严重的外交政策挑战。他,其实,一直在本质上合作与伊朗,其中有已在飞越军事用品伊拉克到大马士革。

JUDY WOODRUFF: What do you see as the long-lasting effects on U.S. foreign policy?(52)
JUDY WOODRUFF:你认为对美国外交政策的长期影响是什么?

RAJIV CHANDRASEKARAN: I think that these sorts of large costly conventional force operations we saw in Iraq, we had in Afghanistan, I think, has led many to recoil here in Washington, particularly at senior levels of the Obama administration.(53)
RAJIV CHANDRASEKARAN:我认为诸如此类的大型昂贵常规部队的行动,我们看到在伊拉克,我们曾在阿富汗,我认为,令很多人在这里退缩华盛顿,尤其是在奧巴馬管理高层。

And, to some degree, I think it's propelled the White House toward a greater reliance on drones, on intelligence operations, on the use of small special forces teams to target terrorist cells around the world, as opposed to trying to go and do more traditional nation-building and remaking of societies.(54)
在某种程度上,我认为它推了白宫对无人驾驶飞机,情报行动,使用小的特种部队小组目标周围的世界,而不是努力去做更多传统国家的建设和改造社会的恐怖分子细胞更多地依赖。

JUDY WOODRUFF: Rajiv Chandrasekaran and Michael Gordon, thank you for helping us look back.(55)
JUDY WOODRUFF:拉吉夫 · Chandrasekaran 和迈克尔 · 戈登,感谢您帮助我们回头看。

RAJIV CHANDRASEKARAN: Pleasure to talk to you.(56)
RAJIV CHANDRASEKARAN:很荣幸与你谈谈。

JUDY WOODRUFF: And we are collecting your Iraq war stories, your reflections and lessons learned on this anniversary. Find out how to share those on our home page.(57)
JUDY WOODRUFF:我们正在收集你的伊拉克战争故事,你的思考和吸取的教训对这一周年纪念。找出如何在我们的主页上与人共同分享。


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